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means, and reckless of the rights of the true owner, appropriates the
property to his own use, the law will presume he did it Intentionally
and wilfully." Also in Central Coal and Joke Co. v. Penny, 173 Fed.
340 (1909), "An intentional or reckless omission to ascertain the boundaries of land of his victim for the purpose of maintaining Ignorance
regarding them, or in reckless disregard of them, is as fatal to the
claim of a trespasser to limit the recovery of damages against him to
the lower measure, as is the intentional or wilful trespass or taking."
While k good many cases go as far as the Harlan Coal Co. case In
stretching the innocent trespasser class, a large number of cases have
followed a narrower doctrine, such as that followed in Griffith v. Clark
Mf1g. Co., supra, and Central Coal and Coke (o. v. Penny, supra, above,
and this seems to be the better rule. There should not only be an honest belief that he is acting within his rights, but also a reasonable
foundation for such belief under the circumstances.
JosEPH D. WnnB.
EASEENTs-THE DOcTRINE OF IMPLIED GwAiT ON QUASI-EASEWENTS.-The subject of creating easements by implication by reference to a previous use is properly divided into two separate and distinct divisions, e. g., "implied grant," and "implied reservation" of an
Tiffany,
easement corresponding to a pre-existing quasi-easement.
Outlines of Real Property, § 274 (1929). For the purpose of this note
we shall confine ourselves solely to the former division, that Is, the
doctrine of "implied grant" of an easement corresponding to a preexisting quasi-easement, which means, as used in this comment, the
creation of an easement by the conveyance of land for the benefit of
the land conveyed, as against land retained by the grantor. 2 Tiffany,
Real Prop. (2d ed. 1920), 1270.
Before going further it is necessary to define the term "quasi-easement" in order to determine when the doctrine of implied grant is
applicable. It has been asserted by eminent authorities that a "quasi
easement" is the utilization of a part of an entire tract of land, or a
portion of two or more adjoining parcels, for the benefit of the other
land, where the entire tract or adjoining parcels are owned by one and
the same person. The reason being that one cannot have an easement
in his own land. Saundeys v. Oliff, Moore 467 (1697); 2 Tiffany, Real
Property (2d ed. 1920), 1272. But that does not explain why it is
called a "quasi-easement." Tiffany, supra, says that it is not called
such because it creates any sort of legal relation, but because such an
expression is a convenient one, and expresses fairly well the meaning
of the term.
That portion of the land which receives the benefit has been designated by judicial opinions and text writers as the "quasi-dominant
tenement," and that part upon which the burden rests is referred to
as the "quasi-servient tenement." 2 Tiffany, Real Prop. (2d ed. 1920),
1272; and cases cited.
The specific question to be discussed in this note arises out of the
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severance of the estate by which the grantee gets that portion above
called the "quasi-dominant tenement." Whether or not such grantee
obtains an easement as against the grantor by the doctrine of "implied
grant" constitutes the specific question.
As the basis of this paper a recent Kentucky decision has been
chosen. There, X, the land owner, used a roadway over one portion
of his land for the benefit of the remainder. The roadway in some
places was cut down to a depth of seven or eight feet, and that such
way was constantly used was apparent even to a casual observer. It
was also shown that the roadway was reasonably necessary for the
use and enjoyment of the quasi-dominant tenement. The court in deciding a controversy between the grantees of the quasi-dominant and
quasi-servient tenement, respectively, adopted the following rule.
"Where a quasi-easement exists, which is apparent and continuous,
and the owner of the land conveys the quasi-dominant tenement to A,
and later conveys the quasi-servient tenement to B, who has notice
of the existence of the easement, If not notice of its use, and such
easement is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of A's tract, B
cannot prevent A from enjoying such easement." Hedges v. Stucker,
237 Ky. 351, 35 S. W. (2d) 539 (1931).
This rule presents two exceedingly important questions to be considered hereafter:
1. Did the conveyance to A create an easement as corresponding
to the pre-existing "quasi-easement"?
2. If so, did the subsequent conveyance to B terminate or destroy
such easement?
The distinction between these two questions was apparently overlooked by the court and they considered them both as one. However,
upon an examination of that case it is clear that both questions are
materially involved. Let us now concern ourselves with the first proposition, that is, did A, by the grant to him, obtain an easement as corresponsing to the quasi-easement"? It has been stated that "a grant
of any principal thine shall be taken to carry with it all which is
necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the thing granted, which it is
in the power of the grantor to convey." New Ipswich,Factory v. Batchelder, 3 N. H. 190 (1825); Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Met. 234 (Mass. 1841).
This statement is weakened considerably by the assertion in 2 Tiffany,
Real Prop. (2d ed. 1920) § 363 (b) where he says: "If the owner of
land, one part of which is subject to a quasi-easement in favor of another part, conveys the quasi-dominant tenement, an easement corresponding to such quasi-easement is ordinarily regarded as thereby
vested in the grantee of the land, provided, the quasi-easement is of an
But more, the
'apparent, continuous, and necessary character.'"
learned author goes further and indicates that the presence or absence
of any or all of these characteristics should not be conclusive, but that
the question of whether an easement has passed should be determined
from the "intention" of the parties to the conveyance. This rule is
advocated in 19 C. J. 102 (D) a, and cases there cited; Worthington v.
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Gimson, 2 E. & E. 618 (1860); Kay v. Oxley, L. R. 10 A. B. 360 (1875).
Thus, the true rule being one of construction, the presence of the
characteristics above mentioned, viz., apparent, continuous, and necessary, should constitute weighty evidence that the parties intended
such easement to pass, but such evidence may be overthrown by showing a contrary intention, such as a verbal agreement at the time of
conveyance that such easement was not to pass. Evert v. Burtis, 12
Atl. 893 (N. J. 1888). The basic case, Hedges v. Stucker, supra, made
no mention of the "intention" of the parties, but rather the court was
content to let the above principles or characteristics operate as conclusive rules of law, and only referred to them in a cursory manner,
without commenting upon any or either of them. Nor has any of the
Kentucky decisions, which have been read in connection with the preparation of this note, placed the test upon the intention of the parties
expressly so, but in all of them it is believed that the ultimate decision was effected more or less by the unconscious consideration of the
intention of the parties. It would be well should the Kentucky Court
of Appeals adopt this rule and expressly set it forth and apply it to
future cases of a similar nature.
This being a rule of construction, it is more freely invoked in cases
involving the question of implied grant than in cases of implied reservation. The distinction is based upon the logical reason that one
cannot derogate from his own grant. Wells v. Garbutt, 132 N. Y. 430,
30 N. E. 978 (1892); Ray v. Hazeldine, 2 Ch. 17 (1904); 19 C. J. 113
(2), and cases there cited. This is no doubt the majority view and
Kentucky is in accord with it. Lebus v. Boston, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 411,
51 S. W. 609 (1899), 47 L. R. A. 79; McGurn v. Louisville, etc., R. Co.,
177 Ky. 835, 98 S. W. 222 (1917). However, this distinction is inapplicable in cases of "reciprocal easements." Henry v. Koch, 80 Ky.
391 (1882). But see Clemens v. Speed, 92 Ky. 284 (1892).
As to the
character and nature of reciprocal easements see 2 Tiffany, Real Prop.
(2d ed. 1920) § 363, note 68. In Wheeldon v. Burrows, 12 Ch. Div. 31
(1878), it was stated that "the general rule is beyond doubt, that if a
grantor upon a conveyance of part of his property intends to reserve
any right over the tenement granted, he must do so by an express
reservation in the grant."
Now let us examine the characteristics above mentioned and determine just what weight if any we shall give to each. It should be
our purpose to place upon each of those terms a connotation that will
accord with logic and which will admit of a practical use, and to do
this we must blend these terms with the rule above referred to on
"intention." Considering them in the order mentioned first examine
the word "apparent." This word should not be given a dictionary construction, but as some courts have done, an easement should be treated
as apparent when its existence is open and visible to the extent that it
is known or should have been known to one reasonably familiar with
the premises on an inspection of them. Butterworth v. Crawford, 46
N. Y. 349 (1871); 2 Tiffany, Real Prop. (2d ed. 1920), 1278. From this
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Interpretation it is clear that the person buying the servient tenement
Is charged with knowledge of the easement, without being actually
informed of its existence, provided such easement is open and visible
to the extent above set out. In Hedges v. Stucker, supra, the easement
claimed was of such a nature that it clearly falls within the definition
of "apparent," therefore, we can say that Kentucky is in accord with
the rule above laid down, which in my opinion is the proper one.
"Necessary" Is next in order, and its meaning under the doctrine
of "Implied grant" must not be confused with its more strict interpretation In cases of "Implied reservation," it meaning in the latter sense
that there can be no other reasonable mode of enjoying the dominant
tenement without the easement, or to put it briefly, that such easement
must be absolutely necessary. Lebus v. Boston, 107 Ky. 987, 51 S. W.
609, 52 S. W. 956, 47 L. R. A. 79 (1899); McGurn v. Louisville, etc., R.
Co., 177 Ky. 835, 98 S. W. 222 (1917). The weight of authority in the
United States holds that the word "necessary," in effect, means nothing more than "highly desirable" in cases involving "implied grant."
Kentucky's interpretation cannot be differentiated from this general
statement, but instead of using the phrase "highly desirable," they
"Reasonably necessary to its enjoyment or
employ the following:
use." Irvine v. McUreary, 108 Ky. 495, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 169, 56 S. W. 766
(1900), 49 L. R. A. 417; Lebus v. Boston, supra; Henry v. Koch, supra;
Stone v. Burkhead, 160 Ky. 47, 169 S. W. 489 (1914); 2 Washburn, Real
Prop. (6th ed. 1902), 290. However, some jurisdictions require strict
necessity. Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick (Mass.) 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302
(1834). See cases cited in 19 C. J. 112 (4). It should also be pointed
out that the use of "necessity" in the sense here applied, should not be
confused with "ways of necessity." Applying this view to the principal ease It appears beyond doubt that the court correctly found that
the easement claimed was reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of
A's field, and the fact that the appellant could construct a road on his
own land from the field to the state highway is immaterial in this
instance. However, this would be applicable in a case of a controversy over a "way of necessity."
The last characteristic has been used interchangeably with "apparent" in a few New Jersey decisions. Fetters v. Humphreys, 18 N.
J. Eq. 260 (1867); Taylor v. Wright, 76 N. J. 121, 79 Atl. 433 (1909).
However, this does not coincide with the general view to the effect
that "continuous" Is not the same as "apparent." Yet, there exists a
conflict of opinion as to the true meaning of the former. Some jurisdictions have considered an easement "continuous" if constantly exercised, while others regard it as "continuous" only if there is a clearly
defined road over the servient tenement, evidently intended for the use
of the dominant tenement. 2 Tiffany, Real Prop. (2d ed. 1920) 1280,
and cases cited In notes. (The eminent author cites a Kentucky case
as adopting this view, Stone v. Burhhead, supra, but it is doubtful that
such was the exact holding in the case). Some have argued that there
should be a distinction between the use of this term when applied to
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rights of ways and other easements, but it is not proper to do so, as
there is no logical reason behind such contention. The true test
whether the easement is "continuous" is whether it imposes upon the
land of the servient tenement a permanent or apparently permanent
burden. 19 C. J. 110 (b); 2 Tiffany, Real Prop. (2d ed. 1920) 1284.
The court in the Ketnucky case under consideration did not expressly treat of "continuous," but from the facts of that case it Is
unquestionable, that if the above test had been applied, it would have
been found that the court was correct in calling this claimed right of
way a continuous one.
Consequently, from the above considerations, the writer is of the
opinion that in the case of Hedges v. Stucker, supra, the grant to A
passed with it the easement claimed, because since it was "apparent,"
"necessary," and "continuous," it should have been presumed to have
been the intention of the parties that it pass, and nothing appearing
to overthrow this presumption, the easement did pass as the court correctly found.
This brings us to the second question, namely, did the subsequent conveyance to B, of the servient tenement, destroy or terminate
the easement? It is well settled that a conveyance of the servient
tenement to one who has either actual or constructive notice does not
destroy the easement, or in other words, does not prevent it from
passing with the conveyance. Higbee Fishing Club v. Atlantic City
,lectric Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 434 (1910); 2 Tiffany, Real Prop. (2d ed.
1920) 1285, and cases cited in the notes. Kentucky follows this view
and in any jurisdiction there can be no doubt but that the easement
is not prevented from passing where the purchaser of the servient tenement has actual notice of the easement claimed. In Jones v. Jones, 31
Ky. L. Rep. 183, 101 S. W. 980 (1907), the defendants contended that
they were innocent purchasers, since they had examined the records
and had found no evidence of plaintiff's right to a passway, and that
their vendor had told them plaintiff's right to a passway was only
permissive, but the court held, that inasmuch as they knew of the
existence of the passway, they were charged with notice sufficient to
prevent the termination of the easement. [As to who has the burden
of showing use was only permissive in Kentucky, see Settle v. Cox, 28
Ky. I. Rep. 510 (1905); Smith v. Pennington, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1282
(1906)]. In Wright v. Willis, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 565 (1901), the Court of
Appeals held that it was not sufficient in such case for the purchaser
to examine the records and inquire of his vendor, but he should also
inquire of those who were using the passway. The court went further
in another case and adopted the view that inasmuch as the passway
was a clearly marked road through the farm, the purchaser must be
charged with notice, and other decisions have followed this view.
From the above discussion we are able to determine what constitutes
constructive notice, in a few cases at least, and in the case under consideration, the road being greatly worn, the purchaser of the servient
tenement must be charged with notice of the existence of the ease-
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ment claimed. Having notice, the court correctly found that the
purchaser of the servient tenement had no right to obstruct the easement, which was created by the doctrine of "implied grant" in the
case of Hedges v. Stucker, supra.
H. W. VINCENT.
MASTER AND SERVANT-MASTER'S

DUTY TO FURNISH

THE SERVANT A

SAFE PLACE TO WORK.-It is the duty of the master to exercise ordinary care to furnish the servant as reasonably safe a place to work
as is compatible with the circumstances.
In the recent case of O'Brien & Co. v. Shelton's Adm'r., 246 Ky.
538, 55 S. W. (2d) 352 (1933), the servant was employed to help wreck
a warehouse. While he was sitting astride a brace engaged in the
work, the brace slipped loose causing him to be thrown to the ground
and killed. Witnesses testified that the work was not being carried on
in the usual, customary, and safe manner.
The court held that the strict "safe place" doctrine was not applicable in the case of the demolition of a building for the reason that
such work is essentially hazardous and the conditions change continually as the work progresses. Under such circumstances the servant
necessarily assumes the ordinary and obvious risks incident thereto.
But the servant does not assume the risks of an extra-hazardous
method adopted by the master as in this case, and the servant may
recover for any injuries resulting therefrom.
The above result is sound. It represents the law in Kentucky and
is supported by the decided weight of authority in other jurisdictions.
Cases involving injuries incurred while engaged in the construction
or demolition of buildings constitute a large percentage of the cases
in which the safe place doctrine is invoked, and they are consistently
held to be an exception or limitation to this rule. Such work is inherently dangerous. The dangers are mostly unforseeable and difficult
to guard against. The employee then assumes the ordinary risks incident to such work. If a building is out of repair that is why it is
being wrecked. Under such circumstances it would be absurd to say
the employer must make the building safe so the servant may tear it
down. Ballard and Ballard Co. v. Lee's Adn'r., 131 Ky. 412, 115 S. W.
732 (1909); Dyer v. Pauley Jail Bldg. Co., 144 Ky. 592, 139 S. W. 789
(1911); Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Watson, 154 Ky. 550, 157 S. W. 929
(1913); Clark v. Johnson County Telephone Co., 146 Iowa 428, 123 N.
W. 327 (1909).
It should be noted in such cases that (1) the plaintiff himself does
not create the danger during the progress of the work, (2) the plaintiff was not engaged in making a dangerous place safe. The significance of these points is obvious for the reason that the employer is
not an insurer of the employee's safety. 39 C. J. Sec. 381; Fuller v. Ill.
Ry. Co., 138 Ky. 42, 127 S. W. 501 (1910). If the type of work is such
that the servant creates the dangers in the progress of the work it
would be unreasonable to hold the master bound to guard against

